CalData · California Office of Data and Innovation
Data ethics and governance in California state government
Lucy Andrews
October 12, 2026
BA in Geology, Macalester College
Drinking water efficiency work
PhD in Environmental Science, Policy, and Management

Senior environmental scientist
Senior data governance strategist
Deliver better government services to the people of California through technology and design.
Work with agencies, departments and the Governor’s Office with the support of the Legislature.
Focus first on people’s needs then find the right technology and policy solutions to address those needs.
Rethink, rebuild, and create services and programs that better serve and engage Californians.
Deliver insights, strategy, websites, digital services, data solutions, training and guidance.
A state department has county-level enrollment counts for a benefits program, broken out by race/ethnicity and age group.
A journalist has filed a Public Records Act request. Additionally, an advocacy group wants the table posted on the State’s open data portal, data.ca.gov.
Some cells count only a handful of people. Many of those are American Indian and Alaska Native residents of small rural counties (using census terminology).
A. Publish as is. The Public Records Act presumes access, and these are counts, not individual records.
B. Suppress small cells. Hide counts under 11, plus any cells that would let someone recover them, then publish.
C. Aggregate. Combine small counties into regions, or small groups into broader categories, so no cell is small.
D. Consult first. Hold the release until affected tribes have been consulted, then decide.
E. Withhold. Deny the request and keep the table off data.ca.gov, arguing that the privacy risk clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
Go to menti.com and enter code 9406 1118
Only the first 50 answers will be logged, so chat with a neighbor and submit one answer for your pair!

Why the ethical bar is different for government than industry
You can delete an app. You can’t opt out of Medi-Cal eligibility checks, the DMV, or taxes. Collection happens under legal compulsion or real need.
Agencies answer to voters, the Legislature, courts, and the State Auditor, not to shareholders.
Government records are presumed open. Companies can protect data as trade secrets.
Much of the state’s technology is procured. Contracts are where values get enforced.
| Consideration | Businesses | State agencies |
|---|---|---|
| Privacy law | CCPA, as amended by the CPRA (Prop 24, 2020) | Information Practices Act of 1977 |
| Core rule | Consumer rights to know, delete, correct, and opt out of sale | Keep only information “relevant and necessary” to an authorized purpose |
| Disclosure | Trade secrets protected | California Public Records Act: access is a “fundamental and necessary right” |
| Enforcement | California Privacy Protection Agency and Attorney General | Agencies, courts, State Auditor, Legislature |
Watch out: two CPRAs
CPRA means both the California Privacy Rights Act (businesses) and the California Public Records Act (government).1
“In framing a government which is to be administered by [people] over [people], the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”
James Madison, Federalist No. 51 (1788)
“The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is fundamental and compelling.”
George Moscone and Kenneth Cory, ballot argument for Proposition 11, which added privacy to California’s Constitution (1972)
Data is where this social contract bargain plays out today: the state collects what it needs to govern and serve, and owes the people it governs limits and accountability in return.
In government, collecting data is a use of state power, so the ethical bar is often higher than in the private sector.
Two public goods in tension
In 1990 Census data, an estimated 87% of the U.S. population was likely unique on just ZIP code, gender, and date of birth.2
Data minimization
“Collecting and keeping the information you need and nothing more.”1
“Do I really need this information to fulfill my goal?” and “Will I actually use it to deliver a service or meet a legal requirement?” If not, don’t collect or store it.
Use data only for the reason it was collected, unless there’s proper justification or consent.
Access or share only what the task needs. For example, an eligibility worker doesn’t need a full medical history.
ODI’s data minimization toolkit grounds these principles in the Information Practices Act, and the Statewide Data Strategy pairs open data with privacy by design and data minimization.2
California’s health and human services agencies use shared de-identification guidelines.1
The tension
Suppression protects individuals, but it can erase whole communities from the public record—often the smallest, most rural, and/or most marginalized.
“What gets counted counts.”
Joni Seager, as quoted in Catherine D’Ignazio and Lauren Klein, Data Feminism (2020)
CalGang is a shared gang database used by law enforcement across the state. In 2016, the State Auditor reviewed it.1
people were listed as younger than 1 year old when entered
individuals reviewed had no adequate support for being in the database
people had purge dates more than 100 years in the future
What changed: AB 90 (2017) put CalGang in statute under Department of Justice oversight.2 Poor data governance had become a civil rights problem.
A state deliberative-democracy platform, launched in 2025 with Los Angeles wildfire recovery, and statewide in 2026 on AI and work.1
Transparency about process can matter as much as transparency about data.
Tribes are sovereign governments, not stakeholders
“Indigenous experiences under colonial control suggest that data more often means ‘something taken’.”
Desi Rodriguez-Lonebear, “Building a Data Revolution in Indian Country” (2016)
Indigenous data sovereignty
“Indigenous Data Sovereignty recognizes Indigenous Peoples’ inherent rights to access, use, and steward data critical for effective governance, and to govern those data according to their own values, principles, and practices.”1
Blood given by Havasupai Tribe members for diabetes research at Arizona State University was reused for unrelated studies. The university settled in 2010 and returned the samples.
Cobell v. Salazar: a 15-year class action over the federal government’s management of individual Indian trust accounts and land. Settled for $3.4 billion in 2011.
The 2020 Census undercounted American Indian and Alaska Native people living on reservations by 5.64%, more than any other group.2
“The danger in damage-centered research is that it is a pathologizing approach in which the oppression singularly defines a community.”
“Even when communities are broken and conquered, they are so much more than that—so much more that this incomplete story is an act of aggression.”
Eve Tuck, “Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities” (2009, 413, 416)
FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, Reusable) is about making data easy to share and reuse.1 CARE adds people and purpose.2
“Data ecosystems shall be designed and function in ways that enable Indigenous Peoples to derive benefit from the data.”
“Indigenous Peoples’ rights and interests in Indigenous data must be recognised and their authority to control such data be empowered.”
“Those working with Indigenous data have a responsibility to share how those data are used to support Indigenous Peoples’ self-determination and collective benefit.”
“Indigenous Peoples’ rights and wellbeing should be the primary concern at all stages of the data life cycle and across the data ecosystem.”
EO B-10-111
Creates the Governor’s Tribal Advisor and directs agencies to consult with California tribes
CalHHS policy2
Departments adopt tribal consultation policies, though most don’t address data
EO N-15-193
Formal state apology and the Truth and Healing Council
AB 1004; CNRA policy4
Tribal financial records shared with agencies are exempt from disclosure as “records of a sovereign nation”
CNRA toolkit5
Guidance on Indigenous data sovereignty for state partners handling tribal data in natural resource contexts
“Each standard and each category valorizes some point of view and silences another.”
Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out (1999)
“American Indian and Alaska Native” is a federal race category. It isn’t the same as tribal nations or tribal citizenship, and it isn’t a tribe’s own definition.1
Tuck’s alternative: “desire-based research frameworks are concerned with understanding complexity, contradiction, and the self-determination of lived lives.”2
Best practices for state entities
If you read one thing from this lecture, make it Eve Tuck’s Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities.
When decisions are automated, who’s accountable?
California EDD, 2020–21: under pressure from pandemic-era fraud, the Employment Development Department used a fraud-scoring tool to flag and suspend unemployment claims.
claims suspended, with no advance notice to claimants1
of those were later found to be legitimate
paid on fraudulent claims, which drove the crackdown2
If algorithms aren’t carefully designed, automated decisions can fail at scale, and the cost often falls on the people with the least power to contest them.
The New Jim Code: “the employment of new technologies that reflect and reproduce existing inequities but that are promoted and perceived as more objective or progressive than the discriminatory systems of a previous era.”
Ruha Benjamin, Race After Technology (2019, 6)
EO N-12-23; AB 3021
GenAI executive order; inventory of high-risk automated decision systems
Guidelines; SB 8962
Procurement guidelines, GenAI risk assessments, and disclaimers plus a path to reach a human
State policy; SB 533
GenAI policy in the State Administrative Manual; frontier developer transparency (the state as regulator)
EO N-5-264
Vendor attestations on bias, civil rights, and privacy
AskCA is an AI assistant that helps Californians find state services, built by ODI and launched as a prototype on October 1, 2026.1
Want to sign up for the beta release? Go to ask.ca.gov!
“This tool may not always get things right.” What’s an acceptable error rate for this kind of tool?
AskCA: check the source links; accuracy isn’t guaranteed. About · Conditions of use
SB 896 requires a disclaimer and a way to reach a person. What does a good path look like?
AskCA: email and in-chat feedback, no live human support. Conditions of use · About
Are GenAI chat logs public records? How do you balance transparency with users’ privacy?
AskCA: collected information is a public record, with exemptions. Privacy policy · Notice on collection
What is the right retention period? Who decides, and based on what considerations?
AskCA: chats kept 60 days. Privacy policy
Which model and vendors sit behind a public service, and where should the public learn that?
AskCA: “third-party service providers.” Notice on collection
If a GenAI answer leads someone to miss a deadline, who’s responsible?
AskCA: ODI disclaims liability for errors and omissions. Conditions of use
Publish what the public needs for government transparency and trust.
Collect and keep only what the purpose requires.
Start from the needs of the people the data describes and serves.
Assess risk, disclose use, test before deploying, and keep humans in the loop.
The suppression threshold you’ll pick in a few minutes is a value choice. As Langdon Winner put it, “the things we call ‘technologies’ are ways of building order in our world.”1
To publish or not to publish · 30 minutes
Load the table and find the smallest cells
Apply a small-cell rule and see who disappears
Rebuild hidden cells from totals, then fix it
Re-identify a fictional person by joining two datasets
Write a one-paragraph recommendation to your director
The small-cell rule
Hide any count of 1 to 10 people, so no one can be singled out from a tiny group. Zeros are shown. This follows California’s health and human services de-identification guidelines.1
0–1718–3435–6465+Total
1. Hide the small cell291917?75The 65+ count (10) is under 11, so it’s hidden.
2. Someone does the math291917107575 − 29 − 19 − 17 = 10. The total gives it away.
3. Hide one more cell2919??75The two add up to 27, but is it 17 + 10? 20 + 7? 26 + 1? No way to tell.
Keep hiding the next-smallest cell in the row until at least two cells are hidden and they add up to 11 or more.
Work on your own or in pairs.
Data note
All data here is synthetic. County names are real and county sizes are roughly realistic, but every count and every person is made up. No real program, community, or tribe is represented.
hidden cells could be worked out from the published totals, until complementary suppression closed the gap
of AIAN enrollees in small counties were hidden, before and after complementary suppression
“de-identified” records were matched to a name using only ZIP code, birth year, and sex
Each fix for privacy had a “cost,” and the cost landed on the same small communities.
Alpine County, White enrollees (synthetic data from the exercise):
| 0–17 | 18–34 | 35–64 | 65+ | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| True count | 29 | 19 | 17 | 10 | 75 |
| Published | 29 | 19 | 17 | hidden | 75 |
Small-cell suppression
Hide any count based on fewer than 11 people, so no one can be singled out from a tiny group. Zeros are usually shown.
The row total is still published. One hidden cell plus a total is one equation with one unknown:
75 − 29 − 19 − 17 = 10
With complementary suppression, one more cell is hidden:
| 0–17 | 18–34 | 35–64 | 65+ | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Published | 29 | 19 | hidden | hidden | 75 |
Complementary suppression
Hide extra cells so the hidden ones can’t be recovered from totals. Now 35–64 + 65+ = 27, but there’s no way to tell how it splits. The cost: a cell of 17 people disappears too.
“De-identified” extract (no names)
| record | ZIP | born | sex | benefit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| R0279 | 96120 | 1957 | F | $350 |
Public roster (names, no benefits)
| name | ZIP | born | sex |
|---|---|---|---|
| Max Lopez | 96120 | 1957 | M |
| Ruth Calloway | 96120 | 1957 | F |
A join lines up rows from two tables that share values in the same columns. ZIP code and birth year narrow 3,000+ residents to two people; sex narrows it to one.
Quasi-identifiers
Ordinary details like ZIP code, birth year, and sex that don’t name anyone alone, but often do in combination. Half the records in the extract were unique on just these three.
Suppression, aggregation, or not publishing: what does each cost, and who pays?
Whom should the department have consulted about the AIAN rows, and when? (“AIAN” is a race category, not a tribal nation.)
In this exercise, AIAN enrollees showed up only as a privacy risk. Was your memo damage-centered? What would a desire-based release look like?
What does “de-identified” actually promise? What should the department have removed before sharing the extract?
A. Publish as is. The Public Records Act presumes access, and these are counts, not individual records.
B. Suppress small cells. Hide counts under 11, plus any cells that would let someone recover them, then publish.
C. Aggregate. Combine small counties into regions, or small groups into broader categories, so no cell is small.
D. Consult first. Hold the release until affected tribes have been consulted, then decide.
E. Withhold. Deny the request and keep the table off data.ca.gov, arguing that the privacy risk clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
Go to menti.com and enter code 9406 1118

Decision 1, the records request: B
Decision 2, posting on data.ca.gov: D, then maybe C
The decision is already late. These questions belong at collection and publication planning, with tribes at the table, not on a records-request deadline.
Questions?
Lucy Andrews, California Office of Data and Innovation
https://innovation.ca.gov
@CaliforniaODI
Public data, public trust · CYPLAN 101